

seems, had been having the time of his life. And in his after-reflections on the whole experience, very penetrating is the observation, "Surely the cutting edge of all our usual misfortunes comes from their character of loneliness. We lose our health, our wife or children die, our house burns down, or our money is made away with, and the world goes on rejoicing, leaving us on one side and counting us out from all its business. In California every one, to some degree, was suffering, and one's private miseries were merged in the vast general sum of privation and in the all-absorbing practical problem of general recuperation. The cheerfulness, or, at any rate, the steadfastness of tone, was universal" (pp. 224-225).

Among many interesting points, incidentally touched on in the book, attention may be specially directed to the criticism of "rot" or "pure boah," as a category (pp. 153 and 191-194); in connexion with fraud in scientific "demonstrations," to the delightful confession of how "I have myself cheated shamelessly" (pp. 181-183); and to the suggestion as to the possibility of a "continuum of cosmic consciousness" (pp. 204-206). It must be noted that with James this last hypothesis functions, not as an excuse for treating the individual consciousness as of no account, but as directing active inquiry into such problems as "What are the conditions of individuation or insulation in this mother-sea?" (p. 205).

HOWARD V. KNOX.

*Significs and Language: the Articulate Form of Our Expressive and Interpretive Resources.* By V. WELBY. Published by McMillan & Co. Pp. x, 105.

It is depressing to consider that the lamented death of Lady Welby renders the present little book the last contribution that she will be able to make to the new science of Significs at the foundation of which she laboured so enthusiastically and with such faith in the value of its ultimate results.

The work under review consists of a number of short essays written at various times but all connected by a common purpose. That purpose seems to be rather to show the necessity of a reform in our modes of expression and the valuable results that would follow from it than to indicate precisely how such a reform is to be accomplished. The burden of nearly all the essays is the use and abuse of metaphor. Lady Welby did not want to abolish metaphor nor was her ideal a scientific nomenclature like that discussed by Mill in his *Logic*. Nor would Leibniz's *Scientia Generalis* with the philosophic language and the encyclopædies so happily arranged that rival philosophers had only to appoint umpires, take pencil and paper, and say 'Calculus,' quite coincide with what she desiderated. She recognised that it is quite essential that words should be used in more than one sense and she regarded metaphor if only it were appropriate as a valuable way of expressing meaning. But she complains that most of our common metaphors suggest ideas that were once believed to be true but are now known not to be so. Hence ambiguity, needless labour in deciding how far a metaphor is to be pressed, and practical certainty of erroneous suggestions. When Significs has really been studied we shall no longer leave language to develop haphazard and every writer will take care to use only metaphors that will bear pressing and every reader will know how to appreciate and understand what is thus expressed. But how this happy result is to be accomplished we are not told in the present work.

Lady Welby is especially severe on the metaphor of 'ground,' and has an amusing discussion of what precisely a man means who says: 'I take

my stand on this fact'. One feels that she would have enjoyed Lowell's neat effect produced by taking this metaphor literally:—

'Here we stand on the Constitution, by Thunder,  
It's a fact of which there's bushels of proofs.  
How d'you suppose we could trample it under  
If we hadn't it always under our hoofs?'

The reformation desired by Lady Welby was not to extend solely to language. Gesture was also to be systematised and we were to try and regain some of the senses that are present in animals and savage men but only rudimentary in us.

C. D. BROAD.

*Priests, Philosophers and Prophets.* By THOMAS WHITTAKER. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1911.

In the sub-title this book is described as "a dissertation on revealed religion"; and in his preliminary chapter the author classifies religions into natural or spontaneous religions on the one hand, and on the other organised and "revealed" religions, which have been "carried to a more self-conscious stage". His thesis is that "the revealed religions of the West were, from the first, constructed religions," the result, that is, of the working "of a general idea that was the result of reflexion, when the growth of the organised natural religions had been completed from within". Among such Western religions he includes those of Zoroaster, of the Jews, and of Mahomet, as well as Christianity. All these were generated by a "combination of the speculative idea" of ethical monotheism "with a pre-existing national cult by a priestly aristocracy".

There follow chapters on the "Rise of monotheism," on "Greece and philosophical theism," on "The Persians and the Jews," which are well written summaries, but hardly more than that, of current learning on those subjects. By far the best written and most original chapter in the work is the tenth and last entitled "the new era". In it he points out that "theism, with a tendency to pass into pantheism, can really claim a pretty wide consensus. And its earliest and latest phases prove it to be quite detachable from the revealed religions. It is not a residue of these, but, if I am right, the idea under which they were formed, disentangled at last from a factitious union." In the few pages which follow are thrown out some interesting thoughts with regard to the existence in or behind the universe of a moral order; and one regrets that more space was not accorded to these speculations, for the chapters (vi.-viii.) on the Jewish Law and the Prophets, on the Christian era, and on Christianity and Philosophy might very well have been left out, especially the middle one of these in which the author takes his inspiration from the School of Drews, W. B. Smith, and van Manen. It is a disconcerting symptom of the sciolism rampant in connexion with the study of Christian origins that one so well informed in general as Mr. Whittaker should attach any importance to the ludicrous equations and arguments by which Mr. J. M. Robertson has attempted to disprove the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth.

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